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THE CHARTER DIALOGUE BETWEEN
COURTS AND LEGISLATURES©
(Or Perhaps The Charter Of Rights Isn't Such A Bad
Thing After All)
BY PETER W. HOGG** AND ALLISON A. BUSHELL***
This article responds to the argument that judicial
review of legislation under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms is illegitimate because it is
undemocratic. The authors show that Charter cases
nearly always can be, and often are, followed by new
legislation that still accomplishes the same objectives as
the legislation that was struck down. The effect of the
Charter is rarely to block a legislative objective, but
rather to influence the design of implementing
legislation. Charter cases cause a public debate in
which Charter-protected rights have a more prominent
role than they would have if there had been no judicial
decision. The process is best regarded as a "dialogue"
between courts and legislatures.
Cet article r6pond a l'argument que la r6vision
judiciaire d'une loi en vertu la Charte canadienne des
droits et libertis est ill6gitime car elle est non
d6mocratique. Les auteurs soutiennent que les causes
rendues en vertu de ]a Charte peuvent presque toujours
Etre, et le sont souvent d'ailleurs, suivies par une
nouvelle 16gislation accomplissant les memes objectifs
que celle rendue invalide. L'effet de la Charte est
rarement de contrecarrer l'objectif visi par une loi,
mais plut6t d'influencer la conception d'une loi qui
donne suite As une d6cision judiciaire. Les arrets
rendues en vertu de la Charte provoquent un d6bat
public dans lequel les droits prot6g s par celle-ci jouent
un rfle plus prddominant que dans 'hypoth~se ofi
aucune d6cision judiciaire ne serait rendue. Cette
approche doit 6tre vue comme un < dialogue > entre les
tribunaux et la l6gislature.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHARTER OFRIGHTS
AS A "BAD THING?"
A. The Legitimacy of Judicial Review
The subtitle of this article is "Perhaps the Charter of Rightsl Isn't
Such a Bad Thing After All." The view that the Charter is a "bad thing"
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
Charter Dialogue
is commonly based on an objection to the legitimacy of judicial review in
a democratic society.2 Under the Charter, judges, who are neither
elected to their offices nor accountable for their actions, are vested with
the power to strike down laws that have been made by the duly elected
representatives of the people.3
The conventional answer to this objection is that all of the
institutions of our society must abide by the rule of law, and judicial
review simply requires obedience by legislative bodies to the law of the
constitution. However, there is something a bit hollow and
unsatisfactory in that answer. The fact is that the law of the constitution
is for the most part couched in broad, vague language that rarely speaks
definitively to the cases that come before the courts. Accordingly, judges
have a great deal of discretion in "interpreting" the law of the
constitution, and the process of interpretation inevitably remakes the
constitution into the likeness favoured by the judges. This problem has
been captured in a famous American aphorism: "We are under a
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." 4
B. The American Experience
In the United States, the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial
review could not be ignored. The long history of the American Bill of
Rights revealed massive shifts in the judicial view of the meaning of the
Bill-shifts that could not be explained except as changes in the attitudes
of the judges to social and economic policies. The decisions of the
Warren Courts (1953-1969), starting in 1954 with Brown v. Board of
2 Of course, this is not the only criticism that can be levelled at the Charter. The Charter's
individualistic values, its reliance on lawyers and courts, and its bias against state action are often
invoked as well.
3 See, for example, A.C. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private Rights/ Public Wrongs: The Liberal
Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278; R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, Charter Politics
(Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1992); and M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the
Legalization of Politics in Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1994). The Charter is
also criticized, but with less emphasis on the argument for democracy, by J. Bakan, Just Words:
Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
4 The quotation is attributed to Governor Hughes of New York, who subsequently became
Hughes C.J. of the Supreme Court of the United States.
5 Earl Warren was the fourteenth Chief Justice of the United States. For more on the Warren




Education6 and ending in 1973 with Roe v. Wade7 (a case that was
actually decided after Warren C.J.'s retirement), wrote a whole new
chapter of American constitutional law, and one that was openly a
departure from earlier jurisprudence. There had been similar shifts in
judicial interpretation before, especially the overruling of Lochner v.
New York in 1937,8 but the decisions of the Warren Court coincided with
the existence of a large class of full-time law professors whose academic
duties required that they provide thoughtful analysis of new
developments in the Supreme Court of the United States. Most law
professors shared the civil libertarian values of the Warren Court and
approved of the outcomes, but they could not ignore the widespread
unpopularity of the decisions, and they had to face up to the anti-
majoritarian objection to judicial review.
A small beleaguered minority of professors simply said that the
Warren Court had departed from the original meaning of the
constitutional text, and that the Court was wrong to do so.9 This was a
courageous solution to the theoretical problem, but it was not
particularly helpful, since it did not make the decisions go away. The
great bulk of the academic commentary was devoted to advancing
ingenious theories to justify judicial review, and each new theory
provoked a further round of criticism and new theories until the
literature reached avalanche proportions3 0 Most of the ideas are
somewhat relevant to Canada as well as the United States, and some
Canadian law professors joined the debate and attempted to apply the
ideas to judicial review in Canada.i
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
9 See R.H. Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems" (1971-72) 47 Ind.
LJ. 1; and R. Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendmend
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
10 The numerous suggestions are catalogued and discussed in J.H. Ely, Democracy and
Distrust:A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) c. 3; see
also P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1982); and M.J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the
Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1982).
11 For example, H.S. Fairley, "Enforcing the Charter: Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and
Just Standard for Judicial Review" (1982) 4 Supreme Court L.R. 217; P.J. Monahan, "Judicial
Review and Democracy: A Theory of Judicial Review" (1987) 21 U.B.C. L. Rev. 87; and P.W. Hogg,
"The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87.
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II. DIALOGUE: WHY THE CHARTER MAY NOT
BE SUCH A "BAD THING"
A. The Concept of Dialogue
The uninitiated might be excused for believing that, given the
deluge of writing on the topic, everything useful that could possibly be
said about the legitimacy of judicial review has now been said. However,
one intriguing idea that has been raised in the literature seems to have
been left largely unexplored. That is the notion that judicial review is
part of a "dialogue" between the judges and the legislatures.12
At first blush the word "dialogue" may not seem particularly apt
to describe the relationship between the Supreme Court of Canada and
the legislative bodies.13 After all, when the Court says what the
Constitution requires, legislative bodies have to obey. 14 Is it possible to
have a dialogue between two institutions when one is so clearly
subordinate to the other? Does dialogue not require a relationship
between equals?
The answer, we suggest, is this. Where a judicial decision is open
to legislative reversal, modification, or avoidance, then it is meaningful
to regard the relationship between the Court and the competent
legislative body as a dialogue. In that case, the judicial decision causes a
public debate in which Charter values play a more prominent role than
they would if there had been no judicial decision. The legislative body is
in a position to devise a response that is properly respectful of the
Charter values that have been identified by the Court, but which
12 Some conceptions of "dialogue" as an interplay between the courts and the legislators or
the people, are explored in the American literature by G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982) c. 11; P.R. Dimond, The Supreme Court
and Judicial Choice: The Role of Provisional Review in Democracy (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of
Michigan Press, 1989) at 4-5; E. Keynes & R.K. Miller, The Court vs. Congress: Prayer, Busing, and
Abortion (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989) at xvi-xvii; and Perry, supra note 10 at 112-
113. Judicial-legislative interplay is discussed in the Canadian context by B. Slattery, "A Theory of
the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 701; and J. Jai, "Policy, Politics and Law: Changing
Relationships in Light of the Charter" (1997-98) 8 N.J.C.L. [forthcoming].
13 See, for example, the criticism of the idea of "dialogue" by A.C. Hutchinson, Waiting for
Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 170.
14 This is the case, of course, by virtue of the supremacy clause in s. 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, which states: "The
Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
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accomplishes the social or economic objectives that the judicial decision
has impeded. Examples of this will be given later in this article.
B. How Dialogue Works
Where a judicial decision striking down a law on Charter grounds
can be reversed, modified, or avoided by a new law, any concern about
the legitimacy of judicial review is greatly diminished.1S To be sure, the
Court may have forced a topic onto the legislative agenda that the
legislative body would have preferred not to have to deal with. And, of
course, the precise terms of any new law would have been powerfully
influenced by the Court's decision. The legislative body would have
been forced to give greater weight to the Charter values identified by the
Court in devising the means of carrying out the objectives, or the
legislative body might have been forced to modify its objectives to some
extent to accommodate the Court's concerns. These are constraints on
the democratic process, no doubt, but the final decision is the
democratic one.
The dialogue that culminates in a democratic decision can only
take place if the judicial decision to strike down a law can be reversed,
modified, or avoided by the ordinary legislative process. Later in this
article we will show that this is the normal situation. There is usually an
alternative law that is available to the legislative body and that enables
the legislative purpose to be substantially carried out, albeit by
somewhat different means. Moreover, when the Court strikes down a
law, it frequently offers a suggestion as to how the law could be modified
to solve the constitutional problems. The legislative body often follows
that suggestion, or devises a different law that also skirts the
constitutional barriers. Indeed, our research, which surveyed sixty-five
cases where legislation was invalidated for a breach of the Charter, found
that in forty-four cases (two-thirds), the competent legislative body
15 Charter challenges to the actions of police officers and other officials do not result in the
striking down of a law, and often will not give rise to any dialogue with the competent legislative
body. In some cases, however, a successful Charter challenge to the action of a police officer or
other official will expose a deficiency in the law that the competent legislative body will want to
correct. This happened, for example, after several cases reviewing surreptitious electronic
surveillance: see Part III(D), esp. note 49, infra. For example, when the Supreme Court of Canada
held that surreptitious electronic searches by police were "unreasonable," infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text, Parliament enacted provisions to provide for the issuing of warrants, and for
warrantless searches in exigent circumstances:An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, S.C. 1993, c. 40,
s. 15, adding s. 487.01 to the Criminal Code.
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amended the impugned law.1 6 In most cases, relatively minor
amendments were all that was required in order to respect the Charter,
without compromising the objective of the original legislation.
Sometimes an invalid law is more restrictive of individual liberty
than it needs to be to accomplish its purpose, and what is required is a
narrower law.17 Sometimes a broader law is needed, because an invalid
law confers a benefit, but excludes people who have a constitutional
equality right to be included.18 Sometimes what is needed is a fairer
procedure. 19 But it is rare indeed that the constitutional defect cannot
be remedied. Hence, as the subtitle of this article suggests, "perhaps the
Charter of Rights isn't such a bad thing after all." The Charter can act as
a catalyst for a two-way exchange between the judiciary and legislature
on the topic of human rights and freedoms, but it rarely raises an
absolute barrier to the wishes of the democratic institutions.
C. Our Definition of Dialogue
In order to examine how the dialogue between Canadian courts
and legislatures has unfolded, we surveyed a total of sixty-five cases in
which a law was struck down for a breach of the Charter. These include
all of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in which a law was
struck down, as well as several important decisions of trial courts and
16 The cases upon which this research is based are detailed in the Appendix to this article.
17 For example, Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232
(advertising regulations for dentists too restrictive, now amended); Ramsden v. Peterborough (City
of), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 (municipal by-law prohibiting postering too restrictive, now amended); and
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (tobacco packaging and advertising laws too
restrictive, now amended). See Appendix for full details on legislative amendments.
18 Some examples are:Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (non-
citizens improperly excluded from legal profession, restriction now repealed); Haig v. Canada
(1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (C.A.) (sexual orientation improperly left unprotected by Canadian Human
Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 3, now added to protected grounds); and Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 418 (common-law partners improperly excluded from statutory accident benefits under the
Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218, now included). See Appendix for full legislative details.
19 Some examples are: Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [hereinafter Hunter]
(unreasonable search and seizure provisions under the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
C-23, ss. 10(1), (3), now amended); R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (unfair procedures for allegedly
insane accused, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C.-34, s. 542(2), now amended); and R. v. Bain,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 91 (unfair jury selection procedures, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 562, now
amended). See Appendix for full details of legislative amendments.
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courts of appeal which were never appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada.20 The breakdown of the cases we looked at is depicted below.
For each case, we searched the regulations and statute books for
evidence of a response to the declaration by a court that a law was of no
force or effect. These "legislative sequels" are the basis for the
discussion of dialogue which follows.
Accordingly, the "dialogue" to which this article refers consists
of those cases in which a judicial decision striking down a law on Charter
grounds is followed by some action by the competent legislative body. In
all of these cases, there must have been consideration of the judicial
decision by government, and a decision must have been made as to how
to react to it. This may also have occurred in cases where a decision was
not followed by any action by the competent legislative body. However,
we have not essayed the difficult task of documenting all of the occasions
when Charter cases were discussed within government but were not
followed by legislative action.21
III. FEATURES OF THE CHARTER THAT
FACILITATE DIALOGUE
A. The Four Features That Facilitate Dialogue
Why is it usually possible for a legislature to overcome a judicial
decision striking down a law for breach of the Charter? The answer lies
in four features of the Charter. (1) section 33, which is the power of
legislative override; (2) section 1, which allows for "reasonable limits" on
guaranteed Charter rights; (3) the "qualified rights," in sections 7, 8, 9
and 12, which allow for action that satisfies standards of fairness and
reasonableness; and (4) the guarantee of equality rights under section
15(1), which can be satisfied through a variety of remedial measures.
Each of these features usually offers the competent legislative body
room to advance its objectives, while at the same time respecting the
requirements of the Charter as articulated by the courts.
20 Our criterion for selection was to examine every case referred to in P.W. Hogg,
ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), in which a law was struck down for
breach of the Charter. A few recent cases which do not appear in the text have also been added. All
of the cases we selected are listed in the Appendix to this article. We believe that the list includes
all of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and most important decisions by the lower
courts.
21 The role of the Charter, and of judicial decisions under the Charter, in the formulation of
government policy is discussed in Jai, supra note 12.
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1. Section 33 of the Charter
Section 3322 of the Charter is commonly referred to as the power
of legislative override. Under section 33, Parliament or a legislature
need only insert an express notwithstanding clause into a statute and this
will liberate the statute from the provisions of section 2 and sections 7-15
of the Charter.23 The legislative override is the most obvious and direct
way of overcoming a judicial decision striking down a law for an
infringement of Charter rights. Section 33 allows the competent
legislative body to re-enact the original law without interference from
the courts. 24
In practice, section 33 has become relatively unimportant,
because of the development of a political climate of resistance to its use.
Only in Quebec does the use of section 33 seem to be politically
acceptable. 25 And even in Quebec there is only one example of the use
of section 33 to overcome the effect of a judicial decision.26 This was a
22 The full text of s. 33 reads:
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of the
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this
Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under this
section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of this
Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it
comes into force or on such earlier dates as may be specified in the declaration.
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under
subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4).
23 The power of legislative override is not available with respect to the rights guaranteed
under ss. 3-6 (voting and mobility), 16-23 (language), and 28 (sexual equality).
24 As is explained in the text below, s. 33(3) provides that a declaration made under s. 33(1) of
the Charter is only effective for five years. It is, however, possible to re-enact a declaration made
under s. 33(1) once the initial five years have elapsed.
25 Outside of Quebec, the power of override under s. 33 has been utilized just once, in
Saskatchewan, to uphold back-to-work legislation which the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had
declared to be a violation of s. 2(d) of the Charter RWDSU v. Saskatchewan (1985), 39 Sask. R. 193
(C.A.). However, the use of s. 33 turned out to be unnecessary as the Supreme Court of Canada
overturned the decision of the Saskatchewan court and upheld the original law: [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
26 Immediately after the Charter came into force in 1982, Quebec enacted an omnibus statute
that added a standard-form notwithstanding clause to all of that province's statutes: An Act
Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, S.Q. 1982, c. 21. This was done, not in response to any Charter
case, but as a protest to the fact that the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 14, including the Charter,
had been enacted without the consent of Quebec. However, when the blanket override came to the
end of its five-year life, no attempt was made to re-enact it for another five-year term.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
response to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1988 in
Ford v. Quebec (A.G.),27 which struck down Quebec's law banning the
use of languages other than French in commercial signs. After that
decision, Quebec enacted a new law that continued to ban the use of any
language but French in all outdoor signs (while allowing bilingual indoor
signs), and the province protected the new law with a section 33
notwithstanding clause.28
A restriction on the use of section 33 is that, by virtue of
subsection (3), the effect of a notwithstanding clause expires at the end
of five years, and has to be re-enacted in order to be continued in force.
This restriction forces a periodic review of the use of section 33. The
five-year period will always include an election, and will often yield a
change of government. Quebec's language-of-signs law, with its
notwithstanding clause, was enacted in 1988, so that the effect of the
notwithstanding clause expired in 1993. By that time, although there
had been no change of government in the province (it was still the
Liberal government of Premier Robert Bourassa), the passions that
supported Quebec's draconian French-language policies had died down
enough that the government felt able to abandon the notwithstanding
clause. In 1993, the Quebec National Assembly enacted a new law which
permitted the use of languages other than French on all outdoor signs as
long as French was also used and was "predominant." 29 The 1993 law
did not contain a notwithstanding clause.
2. Section I of the Charter
Section 130 of the Charter subjects the rights guaranteed by the
Charter to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." In principle, all
the guaranteed rights, and certainly all those couched in unqualified
terms, can be limited by a law that meets the standards judicially
prescribed for section I justification. Those standards, which were laid
down in 1986 in R. v. Oakes,31 are as follows: (1) the law must pursue an
27 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford].
28 An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54, s. 10.
?9An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1993, c. 40, s. 18.
30 The full text of s. I reads: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
31 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138-39 [hereinafter Oakes].
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important objective; (2) the law must be rationally connected with the
objective; (3) the law must impair the objective no more than necessary
to accomplish the objective; and (4) the law must not have a
disproportionately severe effect on the persons to whom it applies.
Experience with section 1 indicates that nearly all laws meet standards
(1), (2), and (4). The dispute nearly always centres on standard (3)-the
minimal impairment or least restrictive means requirement. Therefore,
when a law is struck down for breach of the Charter, it nearly always
means only that the law did not pursue its objective by the means that
would be the least restrictive of a Charter right. If it had done so, then
the breach of the Charter right would have been justified under section 1.
When a law that impairs a Charter right fails to satisfy the least
restrictive means standard of section 1 justification, the law is, of course,
struck down. But the reviewing court will explain why the section 1
standard was not met, which will involve explaining the less restrictive
alternative law that would have satisfied the section 1 standard. That
alternative law is available to the enacting body and will generally be
upheld. Even if the court has a weak grasp of the practicalities of the
particular field of regulation, so that the court's alternative is not really
workable, it will usually be possible for the policymakers to devise a less
restrictive alternative that is practicable. With appropriate recitals in the
legislation, and with appropriate evidence available if necessary to
support the legislative choice, one can usually be confident that a
carefully drafted "second attempt" will be upheld against any future
Charter challenges. 32
Once again, the Ford case can be offered as an example. In that
case, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that the protection of
the French language was a sufficiently important purpose to justify a
limit on freedom of expression. But the Court held that the absolute
prohibition of the use of other languages in commercial signs impaired
the rights of English-speakers more severely than was necessary to
accomplish the purpose. The Court said that a requirement that French
be used, even a requirement that French be predominant, would
accomplish the purpose by a means less restrictive of freedom of
32 There are, however, cases where second attempts have not successfully weathered a new
Charter challenge: amendments to the search and seizure provisions in the Income Tax Act, S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 231, enacted after M.N.R. v. Kruger, [1984] 2 F.C. 535 (C.A.) [hereinafter
Kruger], and Reference Re Print Three Inc. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 321 (C.A.) [hereinafter Re Print
Three], were struck down in Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416; and amendments to the Canada
Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e), enacted after Sauvj v. Canada (A.G.), [1993] 2 S.C.R.
438, were struck down by the Federal Court (Trial Division) in Sauvi v. Canada (A.G.) (Chief
Electoral Officer), [1996] 1 F.C. 857 (this case is being appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal).
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expression. As we previously noted, the government of Quebec was not
initially prepared to take the less restrictive route, and it used section 33
to protect a re-enactment of the absolute ban. But five years later, in
1993, after the expiry of the notwithstanding clause, the government
followed the Court's suggestion 3 3  The 1993 law has never been
challenged, and if it were challenged it would be upheld under section
1.34
Other freedom of expression cases afford similar examples. In
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (1990),35 the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down an Ontario prohibition on
advertising by dentists. However, the Court made it clear that
restrictions on advertising by professionals would be upheld if they were
narrower and directed to the maintenance of professional standards and
the presentation of accurate information to the public. In response to
the judgment, new guidelines on dental advertising were enacted. These
regulations proscribe misleading advertising, advertising that is meant to
"appeal to the public's fears," and advertising which suggests that one
dentist is superior to others, but within the new guidelines dentists are
left free to promote their practices through "factual advertisements." 36
The same type of advertising restrictions now apply to professionals in
many different fields. 37
In RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.) (1995),38 the Supreme
Court of Canada struck down a federal law that prohibited the
advertising of tobacco products. In its discussion of the least restrictive
means standard, the Court made clear that it would have upheld
restrictions that were limited to "lifestyle advertising" or advertising
directed at children. Within two years of the decision, Parliament
enacted a comprehensive new Tobacco Act. 39 The new Act prohibits
33 Supra note 29.
34 In Devine v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, it was held that a non-exclusive
requirement of French for various business forms was a breach of s. 2(b), but because other
languages were not prohibited the requirement was upheld under s. 1.
35 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 232.
36 0. Reg. 220/94, s. 1 (enacted pursuant to the DentistyAct, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 24).
37 See, for example, the advertising restrictions that are imposed by provincial law society
rules: Law Society of Upper Can., Rule 12(2); Law Society of Man., c. 14, Rule 7; Law Society of
P.E.I., Reg. 38(3); Nova Scotia Barristers Sy., Reg. 47A(3). See also the survey of post-Rocket
professional regulations in J.A. Maciura, "Advertising by Self-Regulated Professionals: After
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons" (1995) 16 Health L. Can. 58.
38 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
39 S.C. 1997, c. 13.
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lifestyle advertising40 and restricts advertising to media which is targeted
at adults, 41 but allows tobacco manufacturers to use informational and
brand-preference advertising in order to promote their products to adult
smokers.42
The common elements of these cases are: (1) the law impaired a
Charter right; (2) the law pursued an important purpose; and (3) the law
was more restrictive of the Charter right than was necessary to
accomplish the purpose. In each case, the invalidity of the law could be
corrected by the enactment of a new law that was more respectful of the
Charter right while still substantially accomplishing the important
purpose. The form of the new law would have to take account of the
way in which the Court analyzed the least restrictive means standard of
section 1 justification. Dialogue seems an apt description of the
relationship between courts and legislative bodies. Certainly, it is hard
to claim that an unelected court is thwarting the wishes of the people. In
each case, the democratic process has been influenced by the reviewing
court, but it has not been stultified.
3. Qualified Charter rights
Several of the guaranteed rights under the Charter are framed in
qualified terms. Section 743 guarantees the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person, but only if a deprivation violates "the principles of
fundamental justice."44 Section 845 guarantees the right to be secure
40 Ibid., s. 22(4). The definition of "lifestyle advertising" is as follows: "advertising which
associates a product with, or evokes a positive or negative emotion about or image of, a way of life
such as one that includes glamour, excitement, vitality, risk or daring."
41 Ibid., s. 22(2). The permissible media for the promotion of tobacco products are as follows:
(a) a publication that is provided by mail and addressed to an adult who is identified by
name;
(b) a publication that has an adult readership of not less than eighty-five percent;
42 Of course, the tobacco companies may still choose to attack the new law on the ground that
it, too, is more restrictive of expression than necessary. Only a decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada can definitively affirm that any law is justified under s. 1.
43 The full text of s. 7 reads: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice."
44 There is a theory that holds that s. 7 confers two rights: (1) the right to life, liberty and
security of the person, and (2) the right not to be deprived of life, liberty or security of the person
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. However, while the grammatical
structure of the English (but not the French) text of the Charter supports such a reading, this "two
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against "unreasonable" search or seizure. Section 946 guarantees the
right not to be "arbitrarily" detained or imprisoned. Section 1247
guarantees against "cruel and unusual" punishment. There is some
uncertainty in the case law as to whether the qualified rights are subject
to section 1, although the dominant view is that they are.48 But, even if
section 1 has no application to the qualified rights, by their own terms
they admit of the possibility of corrective legislative action after a
judicial decision has struck down a law for breach of one of the rights.
For example, section 8 does not prohibit search and seizure, but
only "unreasonable" search and seizure. A judicial decision that a law
authorizing a search and seizure is unreasonable can always be followed
by a new law that satisfies the Court's standards of reasonableness. In
fact, section 8 has led to the striking down of many laws (as well as many
particular searches and seizures), but each decision striking down a law
(as opposed to a particular search or seizure) 49 has invariably been
followed by legislative action to correct the constitutional defect and
restore a power of search and seizure, albeit one hedged with more civil
libertarian safeguards than the original invalid version. The notion of a
dialogue is easy to defend in this field, as legislative bodies have
refrained their search and seizure powers to build in civil libertarian
safeguards that meet the requirements of the Charter as set out by the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The first decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on section 8
was Hunter (1984),50 in which the Court struck down the provisions of
the federal Combines Investigation Act that authorized searches and
seizures as part of the investigatory procedures of the Act. The
rights" theory has not been accepted in the jurisprudence, and judges and scholars seem to have
accepted that "the principles of fundamental justice" always qualify the right to life, liberty and
security of the person.
45 The full text of s. 8 reads: "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure."
46 The full text of s. 9 reads: "Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned."
47 The full text of s. 12 reads: "Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment."
48 Hogg, supra note 20 § 35.14.
49 Note however that a decision striking down a particular search or seizure sometimes does
lead to legislative action. For example, when the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
unregulated practice of using electronic surveillance in police investigations violated s. 8 of the
Charter, the federal government enacted provisions in the Criminal Code allowing electronic
surveillance within prescribed limits (for example, with a warrant, or where a police officer is in
danger). See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
50 Supra note 19.
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provisions authorized the director of the Combines Investigation Branch
to enter premises, conduct searches and seize evidence on the basis of a
warrant issued by a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission. The Court held that any searches or seizures conducted
under the Act would be "unreasonable" within section 8, because there
was no requirement that the warrant for the searches or seizures be
issued by a judge, nor was there any requirement that reasonable and
probable cause be established to support the issue of the warrant.
Parliament immediately amended the Combines Investigation Act to
meet the Court's requirements.51
Shortly after the decision in Hunter, the search and seizure
provisions of the Income Tax Act were also found wanting.52 They called
for the warrant to be issued by the Minister of National Revenue, rather
than a judge, and the grounds that would justify the issuance of a
warrant were not adequately spelled out. The Act was immediately
amended to cure this and several other constitutional defects53
However, the new law was then found wanting on the ground that,
although it required that a warrant be issued by a judge and stipulated
the grounds upon which the judge should act, the law did not give to the
judge any discretion to deny the warrant in exceptional circumstances
where the statutory grounds were satisfied. The absence of any
discretion invalidated the power.54 The Act was immediately amended
for a second time to cure this defect.SS
The Supreme Court of Canada has also held that various forms
of electronic surveillance are unreasonable searches or seizures. Even
when police informers made their (admissible) observations more
reliable by the use of hidden audio-visual equipment in the informer's
apartment,5 6 or in a hotel room .used for gambling,5 7 or by the use of a
body pack concealed on the police informer's person 5 8 the evidence
thereby obtained was excluded on the grounds of unreasonable searches
and seizures. These decisions have been criticized as an extravagant
51 The changes were introduced when the Combines Investigation Act was repealed and a new
provision was introduced in the Competition Act, S.C. 1986, c. 26, s. 13.
52 M.N.R. v. Kruger, [1984] 2 F.C. 535 (C.A.); and Re Print Three, supra note 32.
53 AnActtoAmend the Income TaxAct and Related Statutes, S.C. 1986, c. 6.
5 4 Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416.
55 An Act to Amend the Income TaxAct, S.C. 1994, c. 21, s. 107.
561R v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30.
57 R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36.
58R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62.
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extension of the concept of search and seizure and as an unfortunate
impediment to the safety and reliability of police investigations. 59 What
Parliament did, however, was to promptly amend the Criminal Code by
providing for the issuing of a warrant to authorize various forms of
electronic surveillance and providing for measures to be taken without
warrant in situations of emergency or danger to the police officer. 60 It
cannot be said, therefore, that the decisions of the Court had any long-
term adverse consequences, and it is arguable that the area of electronic
surveillance was in need of more regulation, which has now been
provided.
These examples could be multiplied, but there is not much point
in doing so. The search and seizure cases have not subverted the
enforcement powers in statutes or stultified police investigatory
procedures. Rather, they have forced Parliament to review the
investigatory powers in federal statutes and provide for more elaborate
safeguards of individual privacy. There has been a productive dialogue
between the Court and Parliament.
4. Equality rights
Section 15(1)61 of the Charter prohibits laws which discriminate
on the basis of nine listed grounds, namely race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or "mental or physical disability," or laws
which discriminate on the basis of any ground that is analogous to the
listed grounds. Typically, where a law is declared to be unconstitutional
for a violation of section 15(1), the problem is that the law is
underinclusive, such that persons in the applicant's position, who have a
constitutional right to be included, suffer the disadvantage of being
excluded. A judicial decision under section 15(1) does force the
legislature to accommodate the individual or group that has been
excluded.62 Nevertheless, there are a number of different ways of
59 Hogg, supra note 20 § 45.5(b).
60 Supra note 15.
61 The full text of s. 15(1) reads: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability."
62 It will be very rare that a law that is found to be discriminatory under s. 15(1) can be
sustained under s. 1. However it is possible: in Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, five of nine
members of the Supreme Court of Canada found that provisions in Canada's OldAge Security Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9, ss. 2, 19(1), violated s. 15(1), but Sopinka J., at 576, found that the law could be
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complying with section 15(1) that allow the competent legislative bodies
to set their own priorities.
The most obvious solution is to extend the benefit of the
underinclusive law to the excluded group. For example, when the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal held that a law extending family benefits to
single mothers, but not to single fathers, was unconstitutional,63 the
Family Benefits regulations of that province were promptly modified to
allow equal access to family benefits for single parents of both genders.64
The Nova Scotia legislature obviously considered that the provision of
family benefits was of sufficient importance that the program should be
extended rather than eliminated. However eliminating (or reducing) a
government benefit is another option which is open to a legislature
where a law has been held to be underinclusive. After all, it is not the
applicant's right to a government cheque, but rather his or her right to
equality, that the Court has affirmed.
Not surprisingly, legislatures generally choose to extend
underinclusive laws rather than eliminate them outright.65 However this
reflects a policy choice on the part of the competent legislative body. If
the objective of the legislation is of substantial importance, this will
usually justify the added expense or administrative burden (if any) that is
required to eliminate discrimination. Sometimes, the legislature may
instead opt to provide somewhat reduced benefits to all of those who
have a constitutional right to be included. 66 Section 15(1) leaves room
for different legislative choices of this kind, such that democratically
elected bodies are still ultimately responsible for setting their own
budgetary priorities, albeit in a way that does not discriminate against
disadvantaged groups. Section 15(1) decisions therefore leave a door
open for dialogue between the courts and legislatures.
sustained under s. 1. Accordingly, the law was upheld on a five-four majority.
63 Phillips v. SocialAssistance Appeal Board (N.S.) (1986), 76 N.S.R. (2d) 240 (C.A.).
6 4 N.S. Reg. 72/87.
65 In our survey of cases where a law was struck down on Charter grounds, there are no cases
where the competent legislative body has chosen to eliminate the benefit rather than extend it to an
excluded group.
66 This was the solution chosen by Parliament in response to the decision in Schachter v.
Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, which determined that it was unconstitutional to withhold from
natural parents the benefits that were extended to adoptive parents under the Unemployment
Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 32. Parliament's solution (which was actually enacted
before the Supreme Court of Canada made its final decision) was to provide a reduced benefits
package to both natural and adoptive parents: An Act to Amend the Unemployment Insurance Act,
S.C. 1990, c. 40, s. 24.
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IV. BARRIERS TO DIALOGUE: SOME CHARTER DECISIONS
MAY NOT BE "OPEN FOR DISCUSSION"
A. Three Situations Where Dialogue is Precluded
While it is generally the case that Charter decisions leave some
options open to the competent legislative body, and allow a dialogue to
take place between the courts and legislatures, we must acknowledge
that there may be some circumstances where the court will, by necessity,
have the last word. There appear to be three situations where this will
be the case: (1) where section I of the Charter does not apply; (2) where
a court declares that the objective of the impugned legislation is
unconstitutional; and (3) where political forces make it impossible for
the legislature to fashion a response to the court's Charter decision.
1. Where section 1 does not apply
It is possible that some of the rights protected under the Charter
are framed in such specific terms that there is no room for Parliament or
a provincial legislature to impose "reasonable limits" on those rights.
This was the position taken by the Supreme Court of Canada, with
respect to minority language education rights, in the very first Charter
case considered by the Court. That case was Quebec (A. G.) v. Quebec
Protestant School Boards (1984).67 It concerned provisions in Quebec's
Charter of the French Language,68 which restricted admission to English-
language schools in Quebec to those children whose parents had been
educated in the English language in Quebec. By the express terms of
section 23(1)(b) of the Charter, all parents who were Canadian citizens
and Quebec residents, and who had received their primary education in
English anywhere in Canada, had the right to have their children
educated in the English language in Quebec.69 In striking down the
67 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 [hereinafter Quebec School Boards].
68 R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11, ss. 72-88.
69 Section 23(1)(b) of the Charter reads:
(1) Citizens of Canada: ... (b) who have received their primary school instruction in
Canada in English or French and reside in a province where the language in which they
received that instruction is the language of the English or French linguistic minority
population of the province, have the right to have their children receive primary and
secondary school instruction in that language in that province.
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Quebec law, the Court refused to consider the argument, advanced by
the attorney general of Quebec, that the Quebec law could be justified
under section 1 of the Charter as a measure for the protection of French
language and culture. According to the Court, since the law was a direct
contradiction of the terms of the Charter, section 1 justification was not a
possibility.
The Quebec School Boards case is somewhat of an anomaly, and
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision that section 1 did not apply
rested on the somewhat dubious proposition that the Quebec law was a
"denial of' rather than a "limit on" a Charter right.70 The Court has not
refused to consider the possibility of section I justification in any other
case,71 and it may be that the Quebec School Boards case was wrongly
decided. Nevertheless, the Quebec School Boards case does provide an
example of a situation in which it was not possible for the legislature to
overcome the decision of the Court. Since neither a section 1
justification nor a section 33 override 72 was available, Quebec was forced
to abandon its original legislative objective and to comply with the
Court's directions. 73
2. Where the objective of the law is unconstitutional
Even where a court has been willing to entertain arguments
under section 1 of the Charter, a decision striking down a law for a
breach of the Charter will be virtually impossible to overcome if the court
determines that the law fails the first test of section 1 justification: the
requirement that the law have a "pressing and substantial purpose" that
70 The distinction between "denials" and "limits" is criticized in Hogg, supra note 20 § 35.6.
71 The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v.Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 [hereinafter
Askov] is in some ways similar to the Quebec School Boards case. In Askov, the Court designated six
to eight months between committal and trial as the outside time limit for the state to comply with
the right of an accused, under s. 11(b) of the Charter, to a trial within a reasonable time. The Court
refused to accept the Crown's arguments that a delay in excess of eight months should be accepted
as justified, at least for the length of time it would take to remedy the backlog in the courts. While
no law was struck down inAskov, the decision left the Crown with no options; the Crown was forced
to dismiss the charges against more than 47,000 accused persons until more judges and prosecutors
could be appointed to eliminate systemic delay in the courts.
72 Section 33 is only available with respect to s. 2 and ss. 7-15 of the Charter.
73 Quebec did not formally amend the Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11,
to give effect to the decision in the Quebec School Boards case, supra note 67, until 1993: supra note
29, ss. 23-35. Of course, the decision itself had the immediate effect of forcing the province to allow
the children of Canadian citizens who had been educated in English in provinces other than
Quebec, to attend English-language schools.
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justifies limiting a Charter right. In practice, the courts have rarely
declared that a law does not meet this initial threshold. However, there
are a few exceptions in the case law, particularly for laws in which the
purpose of the law, as opposed to the law's effects, are found to violate
the Charter.
The first example is R. v. Big MDrug Mart Ltd. (1985),74 in which
the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the federal Lord's Day Act.75
In that case, the Court determined that the purpose of the Act was "to
compel the observance of the Christian Sabbath."76 This was a violation
of the guarantee of freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter.
Moreover, because the Court held that the Lord's Day Act's primary
objective was contrary to the Charter, there was no possibility of
advancing the same objective through a subsequent amendment of the
Act.77 Accordingly, the Court had the last word when it struck down the
Lord's Day Act.78 The Act was never repealed, but was simply dropped
from the next consolidation of federal statutes.79
A more recent example of legislation which failed to meet the
"pressing and substantial purpose" threshold is the case of Somerville v.
Canada (A.G.) (1996).80 In that case, the Alberta Court of Appeal
unanimously held that provisions in the Canada Elections Act,8l which
limited third-party election expenditures and which established
advertising blackouts at the beginning and end of federal election
campaigns, were unconstitutional for violating sections 2(b) (freedom of
expression), 2(d) (freedom of association), and 3 (the right to vote) of
the Charter. With respect to the third-party expenditures, the majority
of the Court of Appeal held that the Act's purpose was "primarily aimed
at preserving an electoral system which gives a privileged voice to
74 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M Drug Mart]. Note that this case was decided before
Oakes, supra note 31, which set out the standard judicial test for s. 1 justification.
75 R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13.
76 Big MDrg Mart, supra note 74 at 351.
77 The Attorney General of Canada had, however, suggested that the Lord's Day Act had
other objectives, such as the secular purpose of providing a common pause day. The province of
Ontario had enacted a law with the "secular" purpose of providing a common pause day (which just
happened to be Sunday); this legislation was subsequently challenged under s. 2(a) of the Charter,
and upheld under s. 1: R. v. Edwards Books andArt, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
78 Note, however, that it would have been possible, had Parliament been so inclined, for the
Lord's DayAct to be sustained by using the s. 33 override.
79 The Lord's DayAct was not included in the Revised Statutes of Canada 1985.
80 (1996), 184 A.R. 241 (C.A.) [hereinafter Somerville].
81 Supra note 32, s. 213.
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political parties and official candidates within those parties."8 2 Conrad
J.A., who wrote the majority decision, asserted that the law's objective
struck "at the core of these fundamental rights and freedoms
[expression, association and 'informed' voting] and is arguably legislation
which has as its very purpose the restriction of these rights and
freedoms, which can never be justified."8 3 The majority judgment also
dismissed the objectives behind the blackout provisions as being
"illogical" and without merit.8 4 The Alberta Court of Appeal's
condemnation of the Canada Elections Act provisions in Somerville
seems to go beyond striking down the third-party spending and blackout
provisions. The judgment also appears to preclude the possibility of
furthering the objectives of the legislation through an amendment to the
provisions. Where a judicial decision holds that a law has "objectionable
objectives," the only possible way that Parliament or a legislature may
overcome the decision is by the use of the legislative override in section
33. And where, as with the Canada Elections Act provisions, the override
is not available,S5 the court, by necessity, has the last word.
3. Where political forces preclude legislative action
A third situation that may obstruct dialogue between courts and
legislatures is where an issue is so controversial that it seems to preclude
a legislative response to a judicial decision striking down a law for a
breach of the Charter. An example of this is the situation which arose
after the decision in R. v. Morgentaler (1988).86 In Morgentaler, the
restrictions on abortion in the Criminal Code were struck down as
unduly depriving pregnant women of liberty or security of the person,
contrary to section 7 of the Charter. In obiter, the Court added that a less
restrictive abortion law could possibly be upheld.8 7 In 1990, a bill which
would have implemented a less restrictive abortion law was introduced
into Parliament. However that law was defeated on a tied vote in the
82 Somerville, supra note 80 at 263.
8 3 Ibid at 266.
8 4 Ibid. at 266.
85 The s. 33 override was not available to resurrect the legislation struck down in Somerville,
supra note 80, because the legislation was found to violate s. 3 of the Charter (voting rights), which is
one of the guaranteed rights that is immune from the power of legislative override.
86 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler].
8 7 Ibid. at 76, Lamer J.; 82-83, Beetz J.; and 183, Wilson J.
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Senate, and the'divisive issue of abortion has never been revisited, either
in terms of a new law, or even in terms of the formal repeal of the law
that was declared unconstitutional in 1988. While neither the Charter
nor the Court precluded a legislative response to the Morgentaler
decision, the abortion issue is so politically explosive that it eludes
democratic consensus. Accordingly, the Court's decision, striking down
Canada's old abortion law, remains the last word on this issue.
Where political forces, as opposed to the judicial decision itself,
are the reason for a lack of response from the competent legislative body
after a law is struck down on Charter grounds, it can hardly be said that
unelected judges are stifling the democratic process. Quite the opposite
is true, in fact; the Charter decision forces a difficult issue into the public
arena that might otherwise have remained dormant, and compels
Parliament or a legislature to address old laws that had probably lost
much of their original public support. If a new law is slow to materialize,
that is just one of the consequences of a democratic system of
government, not a failing of judicial review under the Charter.
V. THE NATURE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN CANADIAN
COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
A. Most Decisions Have Legislative Sequels
The decisions which have just been discussed, in which a
dialogue between the court and the competent legislative body has not
been possible, are truly exceptional. As we alluded to earlier in this
article, we have found that the majority of cases in which laws have been
struck down on Charter grounds have given rise to a dialogue between
the court and Parliament or the provincial legislature. This trend is
reflected in the accompanying table.
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Table I
Type of Legislative Sequel
Fed. BC AL SK ON QUE NS *Oth. Tot.
tMod.
Before 9 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 11
Repeal 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 7
Mod.
After 21 2 0 0 4 3* 2 1 33
Used
s.33 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
Did
Nothing 10 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 13
* There were two sequels to the case of Ford v. Quebec (A. G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712:
(1) use of legislative override; and (2) modification of the original law. Both of these are
reflected in this table. Thus, the total number of cases is 66. tDenotes a law that was
modified before a final decision was rendered by the highest reviewing court. $Other
denotes delegated legislation, specifically municipal by-laws and Rules of the Alberta
Law Society.
Legislative action of some kind has followed all but thirteen of the sixty-
five cases we surveyed; fully 80 per cent of the decisions in this survey
have generated a legislative response. Of the thirteen cases without
sequels, at least two have been the subject of proposed legislation,88 and
another three have only been decided within the last two years,89 making
88 Morgentaler, supra note 86 (amendments in proposed Bill C-43, An Act RespectingAbortion,
2d Sess., 34th Parl., 1989-90, were defeated in the Senate: Canada, Senate, Debates, 2d. Sess., 34th
Parl., 1989-90-91 (31 January 1991); and Toronto (City oD v. Quickfall (1994), 16 O.R. (3d) 665
(C.A.) (new by-law is in drafting phase: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, Planning and
Transportation Committee, Installation of Poster Signs on Metro Roads, Report No. 12 (Toronto:
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 7 May 1997).
8 9 Reference Re K (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 679 (Prov. Ct.); Reform Party of Canada v. Canada
(A.G.) (1995), 136 A.R. 1 (Q.B.); and Somerville, supra note 80.
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it premature to discount the possibility of a legislative sequel in the
future.
Are all legislative sequels examples of dialogue? We have taken
the position that any legislation is dialogue, because legislative action is
a conscious response from the competent legislative body to the words
spoken by the courts. However, there may be room for debate about
exactly what counts as dialogue. For example, in seven of the cases we
surveyed, 90 Parliament or a provincial legislature simply repealed the
provision that was found to violate the Charter. In those cases, the
competent legislative body simply acquiesced in the decision of the
court, and it might be argued that no true "dialogue" took place.
Similarly, in several cases where competent legislative bodies amended
their laws, the remedial legislation merely implemented the changes the
reviewing court had suggested.91 No effort was made to avoid the result
reached by the court, and in at least one case there was no possibility of
doing so.92 Consequently, those cases, too, might be excluded from the
meaning of dialogue.
But it is probably casting the notion of dialogue too narrowly to
discount those remedial measures that have merely followed the
directions of the Court, either by repealing or amending an
unconstitutional law. After all, it is always possible that the outcome of
a dialogue will be an agreement between the participants! And even if
we did exclude those cases, there would still be a significant majority of
cases in which the competent legislative body has responded to a Charter
decision by changing the outcome in a substantive way. Obviously, on
any definition, dialogue is quite prevalent as between Canadian courts
and legislatures.
90 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; Reference Re
Blainey (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.); R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636; Canadian Disability
Rights Council v. Canada, [1988] 3 F.C. 622 (T.D.); Muldoon v. Canada, [1988] 3 F.C. 628 (T.D.);
Black v. Law Society ofAlberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591; and Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989]
2 S.C.R. 1326.
91 See Appendix for descriptions of the legislative amendments that followed. For example,
Quebec School Boards, supra note 67; Reference Re Hoogbruin (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 718
(B.C.C.A.); Haig v. Canada (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (C.A.); and Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R.
416.
92 See Quebec School Boards, supra note 67.
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B. Legislative Response To Decisions is Generally Prompt
Another finding that emerged from our survey is that Canadian
legislators typically respond promptly to decisions in which a law has
been struck down on Charter grounds. The accompanying table displays
the response time for the cases we considered.
Table H
Timing of Legislative Response
Fed. BC AL SK ON QUE NS Oth. Tot.
Before
Final 9 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 11
Dec'n
<2 yrs 13 3 1 1 4 2 2 2 28
3-5 yrs 8 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
>5 yrs 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
Out of the fifty-two cases in which Parliament or a provincial legislature
has implemented corrective legislation, in thirty-nine cases (or 75 per
cent), the legislative response came within two years. In nine cases, the
legislative response took more than two years, but less than five. In only
four cases did a legislative response take more than five years to be
enacted.
One case in which the legislative response was delayed was
Quebec School Boards (1984).93 In that case, the legislation to bring
Quebec's school laws into conformity with section 23(1)(b) of the
Charter was not enacted until nine years after the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada. 94 As we previously explained, Quebec School
Boards was one of those rare cases in which the legislature was forced to
accept the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada. Of course, the
94 Supra note 29, ss. 23-35.
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decision of the Court had to be complied with by Quebec school boards
even before the corrective legislation was enacted. But perhaps the
delay in formally implementing corrective legislation can be seen as
somewhat of a protest by successive Quebec governments to the
outcome of the case. In that sense, even the lack of legislative action
following the Court's decision might be viewed as a kind of "dialogue."
All of the remaining three cases95 in which a legislative response
has taken longer than five years to materialize have concerned the
federal legislation controlling the trade in illegal narcotics. 9 6 The
affected provisions, which were struck down in the 1980s, were not the
subject of legislative attention until 1996, when the old narcotic control
legislation was repealed and replaced with a new Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act.97 In these three cases, Parliament's delay in addressing
the constitutional flaws in the old legislation was not intended as a
protest to the judicial decisions. Rather, because the laws in question
(reverse onus provisions and minimum sentence provisions) were of a
kind that could be complied with by prosecutors and courts without any
formal amendment of the impugned laws, the need for corrective
legislation could be given lower priority on the legislative agenda. In
fact, it is notable that, of the nine cases in which Parliament has not
enacted remedial legislation to date, five concern provisions in the
Criminal Code.98 Because the Crown and courts administer the criminal
law, prosecutors and judges can be counted on to adjust their practices
to comply with the Charter even before changes have been formally
implemented through new legislation. The tendency of governments to
postpone amendments to criminal justice legislation is also apparent in
the accompanying table, which shows the response time of Canadian
governments to judicial decisions, by reference to the Charter section
that was found to have been violated.
95 R. v. Stanger (1983), 46 A.R. 241 (C.A.); Oakes, supra note 31; and R. v. Smith, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1045.
96 Two statutes were involved: the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, and the Narcotic
ControlAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1.
97 S.C. 1996, c. 19.
98 These cases are: Morgentaler, supra note 86 (concerning abortion offence); R. v.Martineau,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (concerning necessary mental element for murder in the commission of another
offence); R. v. Downey, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10 (concerning the offence of living off the avails of
prostitution); K v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (concerning the offence of wilfully publishing false
news); and K v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (concerning the criteria for the denial of bail).
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Table I
Legislative Response Time by Charter Section
Charter Before Respond Respond More Than
Section Final Within Within 5 years
Decision 2 years 3-5 years to Respond
2 (a) 0 2 0 0
2 (b) 1 6 2 0
2 (d) 0 1 0 0
3 0 3 2 0
6 (2) (b) 0 1 0 0
7 3 4 1 0
8 2 4 3 0
9 0 1 0 0
11 (a) 0 1 0 0
11 (d) 0 4 0 2
11 (h) 0 1 0 0
12 1 0 0 1
15(1) 4 2 1 0
23 (1) (b) 0 0 0 1
C. Legislators Are Engaging in "Charter-Speak"
The nature of the Charter dialogue between Canadian courts and
legislatures is not reflected in numbers alone. The language of post-
Charter laws themselves, particularly in statutory preambles and purpose
clauses, suggests that Canadian legislators are engaging in a self-
conscious dialogue with the judiciary. Where laws closely skirt the
boundaries of the Charter, and particularly where new laws are enacted
to replace those that have been struck down on Charter grounds, it is not
uncommon for the preamble to a statute to explain how the measures
taken in the legislation are directed at a "pressing and substantial"
objective, and are intended to "reasonably limit" rights and freedoms.
Several of the legislative sequels to the cases considered in our survey
provide ready examples of this trend. For instance, in Canadian Civil
Liberties Association v. Ontario (Minister of Education) (1990),99 the
Ontario Court of Appeal struck down the regulations pertaining to
99 (1990), 71 O.R. (2d) 341 (C.A.) [hereinafter CCLA].
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religious education in Ontario's schools on the ground that they violated
the guarantee of freedom of religion in section 2(a) of the Charter.
Ontario had already attempted to bring its religious education
regulations in line with the Charter after the Ontario Court of Appeal
struck down the province's religious education regulations in 1988 for a
breach of section 2(a) in Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education
(Director),100 two years before CCLA. Soon after the CCLA case,
Ontario made another attempt to enact guidelines for religious
education which could be sustained under the Charter. The new
guidelines made religious education programs an optional part of the
prescribed curriculum, and they specifically declared that the province's
revised regulations were designed to "promote respect for the freedom
of conscience and religion guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms ... ."1o1 Ontario legislators thereby acknowledged the
obligations under the Charter which the Court of Appeal had pointed
out to them, and signalled that the new legislation was, in their view,
within the boundaries of the Charter. This seems to be an explicit
example of dialogue.
The federal government responded in a similar way to the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Committee for the
Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada (1991).102 The decision had struck
down part of the Government Airport Concession Operation Regulations
(GACOR) as being unduly restrictive of freedom of expression. The
case had been brought by two members of a political movement, who
were prevented by the GACOR from disseminating their views at Dorval
Airport in Montreal. In 1995, the regulations were replaced with less
restrictive limits on expression in Canada's airports.103 Along with the
new regulations, the federal Department of Transport also issued a
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement which explained that the vacuum
left by the invalidation of the old regulations had led to chaos in the
airports, and even "physical confrontations," because there had no
longer been any effective regulation of vendors and service providers
operating out of Canadian airports.104 The Impact Analysis Statement
also explicitly mentioned the Commonwealth case, and noted that the
new federal regulations did not limit the type of (non-commercial)
100 (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (C.A.).
101 0. Reg 677190, ss. 29, 29a.
102 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter Commonwealth].
1 0 3 SOR/95-228.
104 Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 1995.11.1467.
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expression that had been the focus of that case. While the Regulatory
Impact Analysis Statement did not have the force of law, it did
emphasize that the government had attempted to respect its Charter
obligations, and that the limits on expression in the new regulations were
directed at "pressing and substantial" concerns.
A third example of a government engaging in "Charter-speak"
when enacting new laws is Parliament's response to the decision in R. v.
Daviault (1994).105 In that case, counsel for Mr. Daviault, who had been
convicted of sexual assault, successfully argued in the Supreme Court of
Canada that sections 7 and 11(d)106 of the Charter required that an
accused person be permitted to advance the defence that he was in a
state of "drunkenness akin to automatism," and lacked the requisite
mens rea for the crime. Prior to the Daviault judgment, the common law
rule had been that a drunkenness defence was not open to a person
accused of a "general intent" crime such as sexual assult. The Supreme
Court of Canada accepted Mr. Daviault's argument that extreme
drunkenness was a defence, and the Court granted him a new trial.
There was a significant public outcry, particularly by victims'
groups and women's groups, after the Daviault decision. Parliament
responded with legislation providing that self-induced intoxication would
no longer be a defence to a criminal offence involving "an assault or any
other interference or threat of interference by a person with the bodily
integrity of another person."107 The legislation explained that criminal
responsibility would attach to persons who committed violent "general
intent" crimes while intoxicated, because the state of self-induced
105 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
106 The full text of s. 7 is reproduced, supra note 43. The full text of s. 11(d) reads: "Any
person charged with an offence has the right ... (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal."
107 S.C. 1995, c. 32, s. 1, adding a new s. 33.1 to the Criminal Code. The full text of the new
self-induced intoxication provisions reads:
(1) It is not a defence to an offence referred to in subsection (3) that the accused, by
reason of self-induced intoxication, lacked the genereal intent or the voluntariness
required to commit the offence, where the accused departed markedly from the standard
of care as described in subsection (2).
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person departs markedly from the standard of
reasonable care generally recognized in Canadian society and is thereby criminally at
fault where the person, while in a state of self-induced intoxication that renders the
person unaware of, or incapable of consciously controlling, their behaviour, voluntarily or
involuntarily interferes or threatens to interfere with the bodily integrity of another
person.
(3) This section applies in respect of an offence under this Act or any other Act of
Parliament that includes as an element an assault or any other interference by a person
with the bodily integrity of another person.
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intoxication is a marked departure "from the standard of reasonable
care generally recognized in Canadian society."108 What is remarkable
about the post-Daviault legislation is that Parliament has basically
enacted without modification the very propositions of law that the
Supreme Court of Canada rejected in the Daviault case. However, the
statute also includes a lengthy preamble offering justifications for the
new law, including the association between intoxication and violence
against women and children. Parliament's part in the dialogue on this
issue reads like a rebuttal of the majority's position in Daviault, and it
will be interesting to see how the courts will respond when the issue
comes before them for a second time. 09
D. Dialogue May Occur Even When Laws Are Upheld
This article has focussed primarily on the legislative changes that
have followed decisions striking down laws for a breach of the Charter.
However, it should be noted that judicial decisions can occasionally have
an impact on legislation even when the court does not actually strike
down any law.
An example of this is the aftermath of the 1995 judgment in
Thibaudeau v. Canada.110 The case concerned provisions in the Income
Tax Act which allowed a non-custodial parent to deduct child-support
payments from (generally his) income, and which required a custodial
parent to include child support payments in (generally her) income. The
applicant, a custodial parent, claimed that her obligation to pay income
tax on the child-support payments she received from the non-custodial
parent infringed section 15(1) (the equality guarantee) of the Charter.
However, a majority in the Supreme Court of Canada rejected her claim,
holding that that there was no breach of section 15(1). Ms.
Thibaudeau's case attracted a great deal of media attention, and
exposed the fact that the Income Tax Act could sometimes lead to
hardship for custodial parents. Consequently, even though the Attorney
General of Canada had prevailed in the courts, he announced shortly
after the Thibaudeau decision that Parliament would change the
108 Ibid.
109 There has not yet been a direct challenge to s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code (the self-induced
intoxication provisions), although an Ontario provincial court has held that the legislation does not
apply with respect to offences committed before the provisions came into force: R. v. McShane,
[1996] O.J. No. 361 (QL) (Prov. Ct.).
110 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 [hereinafter Thibaudeau].
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inclusion-deduction scheme for child support payments in the Income
Tax Act. Amendments to the Act were enacted in 1997, under which
child support payments are no longer deductible by the non-custodial
parent, and are no longer taxable as income of the custodial parent.Ill
Parliament's response to the Thibaudeau decision emphasizes
that it is a mistake to view the Charter as giving non-elected judges a veto
over the democratic will of competent legislative bodies. Canada's
legislators are not indifferent to the equality and civil liberties concerns
which are raised in Charter cases, and do not always wait for a court to
"force" them to amend their laws before they are willing to consider
fairer, less restrictive, or more inclusive laws. The influence of the
Charter extends much further than the boundaries of what judges define
as compulsory. Charter dialogue may continue outside the courts even
when the courts hold that there is no Charter issue to talk about.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our conclusion is that the critique of the Charter based on
democratic legitimacy cannot be sustained. To be sure, the Supreme
Court of Canada is a non-elected, unaccountable body of middle-aged
lawyers. To be sure, it does from time to time strike down statutes
enacted by the elected, accountable, representative legislative bodies.
But, the decisions of the Court almost always leave room for a legislative
response, and they usually get a legislative response. In the end, if the
democratic will is there, the legislative objective will still be able to be
accomplished, albeit with some new safeguards to protect individual
rights and liberty. Judicial review is not "a veto over the politics of the
nation,"112 but rather the beginning of a dialogue as to how best to
reconcile the individualistic values of the Charter with the
accomplishment of social and economic policies for the benefit of the
community as a whole.
111 Income Tax Budget Amendments Act, 1996, S.C. 1997, c. 25. The amendments apply only
to orders for child support made or varied after the enactment of the amendment. This is because
the quantum of pre-1997 child support orders would have been determined with reference to the
Income Tax Act provisions which then applied. The amendments do, however, allow parents to
elect to be taxed on pre-1997 child support payments pursuant to the new scheme.




TO LAWS NULLIFIED FOR BREACH
OF THE CHAR TER*
R. v. Lucas
(1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 159 (A.D.).
Law Affected: Ability to give an overly vague short form to substitute for
a description of the offence with which the accused was charged:
Summary Proceedings Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 18, s. 5(1), as am. by S.N.S.
1977, c. 69, s. 5A.
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(a).
Legislative Sequel: A regulation was enacted to amend the section
prescribing how an offence under the Summary Proceedings Act was to
be described to an accused: N.S. Reg. 13/84.
Reference Re Mitchell and the Queen
(1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 481 (H.C.J.).
Law Affected: Indeterminate sentences to be imposed on "habitual
criminals": Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 688.
Charter Section Breached: s. 12.
Legislative Sequel: The provisions themselves had already been repealed
by the time of this decision: Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1977, S.C.
1976-77, c. 53, s. 14. Indeterminate sentences still exist for "dangerous
offenders": Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c-46, s. 753.
R. v. Stanger
(1983), 46 A.R. 241 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Reverse onus clauses: Narcotic ControlAct, R.S.C. 1970, c.
N-i, s. 8, and Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27, s. 43.
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(d).
Legislative Sequel: Both the Food and Drugs Act and the Narcotic
Control Act were repealed and replaced with the Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, which does not contain a reverse onus
clause.
Reference Re Southam Inc. and the Queen (No. 1)
(1984), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.).
* This appendix lists the sequels to laws which were struck down for breach of the Charter. In
some cases, the changes to the law will have predated the case, since the unconstitutional provision
was the law in force at the time that the facts of the case arose.
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Law Affected: Closed-court provisions: Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. J-3, ss. 12, 36.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: By the time of this decision the Juvenile Delinquents
Act had been repealed and replaced: Young Offenders Act, S.C. 1980-81-
82-83, c. 110. Section 39 of this Act allows for the trials of young persons
to be held in camera at the judge's discretion. This provision was
subsequently upheld in Reference Re Southam Inc. and the Queen (1986),
53 O.R. (2d) 663 (C.A.).
Reference Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society
(1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 80 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Ontario censorship provisions which set no legal standards
for discretion: TheatresAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 498, ss. 3(2)(a), (b), 35, 38.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b), and s. 1 requirement that limits be
"prescribed by law."
Legislative Sequel: The Theatres Act was amended to implement an
appeal procedure to Board decisions: An Act to Amend the Theatres Act,
S.O. 1984, c. 56, ss. 35(8), (9). As well, regulations pursuant to the
Theatres Act now set out detailed guidelines: 0. Reg. 487/88 (see
especially s. 14, "Board Criteria for Refusal to Approve").
National Citizens' Coalition v. Canada (A.G.)
(1984), 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 249 (Q.B.).
Law Affected: Restrictions on third-party campaign expenditures:
Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 14, s. 70.1(1), as am. by
S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 164, s. 14.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: No legislative sequel was found, but there have been
two recent sequels in the Courts. Other Canada Elections Act provisions
aimed at controlling expenses were declared of no force or effect by the
Alberta Court of Appeal in Somerville v. Canada, below, and in Reform
Party of Canada v. Canada (A.G.) (1995), 174 A.R. 169 (C.A.).
Quebec (A.G.) v. Quebec Protestant School Boards,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 66.
Law Affected: More restrictive eligibility rules for attending minority
language (English) schools than provided in the Canadian Charter:
Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11, ss. 72-88.
Charter Section Breached: s. 23(1)(b).
Legislative Sequel: The Charter of the French Language was amended to
comply with the Canadian Charter, but not until 1993: An Act to Amend
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the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1993, c. 40, ss. 23-35.
Hunter v. Southam Inc.,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
Law Affected: Search and seizure provisions: Combines Investigation Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, ss. 10(1), (3).
Charter Section Breached: s. 8.
Legislative Sequel: A new procedure for getting search warrants, issued
by the Federal Court, was instituted by the Combines Investigation Act's
successor: Competition Act, S.C. 1986, c. 26, s. 13.
M.N.R. v. Kruger,
[1984] 2 F.C. 535 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Search and seizure provisions: Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-
71-72, c. 63, ss. 231(4), (5) (see also Reference Re Print Three, below).
Charter Section Breached: s. 8.
Legislative Sequel: The provisions were amended in 1986: An Act to
Amend the Income Tax Act and Related Statutes, S.C. 1986, c. 6, s. 121,
but the modifications were also found to be unconstitutional in Baron v.
Canada, below.
Luscher v. Revenue Canada,
[1985] 1 F.C. 85 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Prohibition on importing "immoral or indecent" books:
Customs Tariff, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-41, s. 14, Schedule C, tariff item 99201-
1.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b), and s. 1 requirement that limits be
"prescribed by law."
Legislative Sequel: In 1987, the Customs Tariff schedules which were in
effect at the time of this case were completely repealed and replaced:
Customs Tariff, S.C. 1987, c. 49 to R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 41. An item
equivalent to the one struck down in this case appears in Schedule VII,
as item 9956. Instead of the vague references to "immoral and indecent
character" which were impugned in Luscher, item 9956 prohibits books
and other media which offend s. 159(8) (obscenity) and/or s. 281.3(8)
(hate propaganda) of the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1970, C-34 as am. by
R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 11, s. 1.
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration),
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
Law Affected: Refugee determination provisions: Immigration Act, 1976,
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S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 2, 45, 55, 70, 71.
Charter Section Breached: s. 7 (and s. 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights,
S.C. 1960, c. 44).
Legislative Sequel: New procedures for hearing claims were
implemented in 1986: An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C.
1986, c. 13, s. 5.
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
Law Affected: Sundayclosing: Lord's DayAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13, in its
entirety.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(a).
Legislative Sequel: Although there is no Act or order repealing the
Lord's DayAct to be found on the books, theAct was not recorded in the
R.S.C. 1985, and stops appearing in the Table of Statutes for the
Statutes of Canada as of 1990.
RWDSU v. Saskatchewan
(1985), 39 Sask. R. 193 (C.A.).
Law Affected: A Saskatchewan back-to-work law affecting the plaintiffs
in this case: Dairy Workers (Maintenance of Operations) Act, S.S. 1983-84,
c. D-1.1, ss. 2(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), 3(a), 6, 7(b), (c), 8.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(d) (as held by the Sask. C.A.).
Legislative Sequel: Saskatchewan re-enacted the law by invoking s. 33 of
the Charter with an explanatory preamble: The SGEU Dispute Settlement
Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. 111. This proved unnecessary when the S.C.C.
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and held that the original
enactment had been constitutional: RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 460.
Reference Re Print Three Inc.
(1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 321 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Search and seizure provisions: Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-
71-72, c. 63, s. 231, (see also M.N.R. v. Kruger, above).
Charter Section Breached: s. 8.
Legislative Sequel: The impugned provisions were modified in 1986: An
Act to Amend the Income Tax Act and Related Statutes, S.C. 1986, c. 6, s.
121, but the modifications were also found to be unconstitutional in
Baron v. Canada, below.
[VOL. 35 NO. 1
Charter Dialogue-Appendix
Reference Re Hoogbruin
(1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 718 (B.C.C.A.).
Law Affected: No provisions for absentee voters: Election Act, R.S.B.C.
1979, c. 103, s. 2(1).
Charter Section Breached: s. 3.
Legislative Sequel: British Columbia amended s. 2(1) to include
absentee voting provisions in 1987: Election Amendment Act, 1987,
S.B.C. 1988, c. 2. The federal Election Act was similarly amended in
1993: An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1993, c. 19,
Schedule II, Part III.
Reference Re Section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
Law Affected: Absolute liability offence which was subject to a minimum
term of imprisonment: Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288, s. 94(2),
as am. by S.B.C. 1982, c. 36, s. 19.
Charter Section Breached: s. 7.
Legislative Sequel: British Columbia repealed the impugned subsection
in 1986: Motor Vehicle Amendments Act, 1986, S.B.C. 1986, c. 19, s. 5.
The province also enacted a new provision to the Offence Act, stipulating
that "Notwithstanding section 4 (the general penalty clause) or the
provisions of any other Act, no person is liable to imprisonment with
respect to an absolute liability offence": R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 305, s. 4.1 as
am. by Attorney General Statute Amendment Act (No. 2), 1990, S.B.C.
1990, c. 34, s. 10. In R. v. Pontes, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44, a 5-4 majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada held that despite the 1986 repeal of the
Motor Vehicle Act subsection impugned in Reference Re Section 94(2) of
the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, driving with a suspended licence remained an
absolute liability offence. Section 4.1 of the Offence Act was therefore
used by the Court to read down a penalty of imprisonment for that
offence.
R. v. Oakes,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
Law Affected: Reverse onus clause in the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. N-1, s. 8.
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(d).
Legislative Sequel: The Narcotic ControlAct was repealed and replaced
with the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act: S.C. 1996, c. 19, which
does not contain a reverse onus clause.
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Reference Re Blainey
(1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.).
Law Affected: An exemption for same-sex sports from gender equality
provisions: Human Rights Code, S.O. 1981, c. 53, s. 19(2).
Charter Section Breached: s. 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: The impugned subsection was repealed in 1986: An
Act to Amend Certain Ontario Statutes to Conform to Section 15 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, S.O. 1986, c. 64, s. 18(12).
Phillips v. Social Assistance Appeal Board (N.S.)
(1986), 76 N.S.R. (2d) 240 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Provisions which gave single mothers more liberal access
to benefits than that afforded to single fathers in Nova Scotia: Family
Benefits Act, S.N.S. 1977, c. 8, s. 5(4).
Charter Section Breached: s. 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: Alterations were made to the regulations passed
pursuant to the Family Benefits Act which amended the impugned
provisions to allow equal access to family benefits to single parents of
both genders: N.S. Reg. 72/87.
R. v. Sieben,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 295.
Law Affected: Writs of assistance: Narcotic Cohtrol Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
N-1, ss. 10(1)(a), (2), (3).
Charter Section Breached: s. 8.
Legislative Sequel: Writs of assistance were repealed prior to the S.C.C.
case: Criminal LawAmendment Act, 1985, S.C. 1985, c. 19, s. 200.
R. v. Hamill,
[19871 1 S.C.R. 301.
Law Affected: Writs of assistance: Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
N-1, ss. 10(1)(a), (2), (3).
Charter Section Breached: s. 8.
Legislative Sequel: Writs of assistance were repealed prior to the S.C.C.
case: Criminal LawAmendment Act, 1985, S.C. 1985, c. 19, s. 200.
MacLean v. Nova Scotia (A.G.)
(1987), 76 N.S.R. (2d) 296 (T.D.).
Law Affected: Statute making those convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment for five or more years ineligible to become candidates for
the Nova Scotia House of Assembly for a five-year period: Ironically
(since it was struck down) the impugned statute was entitled An Act
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respecting reasonable limits for membership in the House of Assembly,
S.N.S. 1986, c. 104, s. 1 (bound in S.N.S. 1987) [our emphasis].
Charter Section Breached: s. 3.
Legislative Sequel: No sequel found.
R. v. Smith,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
Law Affected: Minimum term of imprisonment for importing narcotics:
Narcotic ControlAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-i, s. 5(2).
Charter Section Breached: s. 12.
Legislative Sequel: The Narcotic ControlAct was repealed and replaced
with the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, which
does not prescribe a minimum sentence for importing listed substances.
R. v. Vaillancourt,
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 636.
Law Affected: "Felony murder" or "constructive murder" offence
(murder offence for causing death in the course of committing another
crime with no mens rea requirement, subjective or objective, with respect
to death): Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213(d) as am. by
Criminal Law Amendment, 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 13.
Charter Section Breached: s. 7.
Legislative Sequel: The subsection creating this offence was repealed
from the Criminal Code: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, S.C. 1991,
c. 4, s. 1.
R. v. Morgentaler,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
Law Affected: Abortion offence: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s.
251.
Charter Section Breached: s. 7.
Legislative Sequel: In 1991, Bill C-43, An Act Respecting Abortion, 2d
Sess., 34th Parl., 1989-90, which would have enacted a less restrictive
abortion law, was defeated in the Senate: Canada, Senate, Debates, 2d
Sess., 34th Pad., 1989-90-91 (31 January 1991) at 5307. The old abortion
laws remain "on the books" although being of no force or effect.
Corporation Professionnelle des Mdecins du Qubec v.Thibault,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 1033.
Law Affected: Provisions which, in practice, allowed for an acquittal to
be appealed by way of a trial de novo: Summary Convictions Act, R.S.Q.
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
1977, c. P-15, ss. 75, 78.
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(h).
Legislative Sequel: The Summary Convictions Act was repealed and
replaced in 1990: Code of Penal Procedure, S.Q. 1990, c. 4.
Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director)
(1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Regulations pursuant to Ontario's Education Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 129, s. 50, authorizing and prescribing the form of religious
instruction in public schools: R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 262, s. 28(1).
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(a).
Legislative Sequel: The subsection which was specifically impugned was
revoked in 1989 and modifications to related provisions were made in
response to other criticisms raised in this case: 0. Reg 6/89, s. 2(2). The
modifications were not enough to prevent another Charter challenge to
Ontario's religious education regulations, however (see Canadian Civil
Liberties Association v. Ontario (Minister of Education), below).
Canadian Disability Rights Council v. Canada,
[1988] 3 F.C. 622 (T.D.).
Law Affected: Denying voting rights to persons with "mental disease":
Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 14, s. 14(4)(f).
Charter Section Breached: s. 3.
Legislative Sequel: Mental disease was repealed as a ground for
disenfranchisement in 1993: An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act,
S.C. 1993, c. 19, s. 23(3).
Muldoon v. Canada,
[1988] 3 F.C. 628 (T.D.).
Law Affected: Provisions disqualifying federally-appointed judges from
voting in federal elections: Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st
Supp.), c. 14, s. 14(4)(d), as am. byAn Act Respecting Citizenship, S.C.
1974-75-76, c. 108, s. 42.
Charter Section Breached: s. 3.
Legislative Sequel: By 1993 amendment, judges may now vote in federal
elections: An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1993, c. 19, s.
23(1).
Ford v. Quebec (A.G.),
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
Law Affected: Provisions stipulating that public signs in Quebec be in
French only: Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11, ss. 58,
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69, 214.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: The ban on English language signs was initially
preserved by operation of an Act invoking s. 33 of the Canadian Charter.
An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54, s.
10. In 1993, the legislation was modified to permit other languages on
public signs as long as French was present and "predominant": An Act to
Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1993, c. 40, s. 18.
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
Law Affected: Canadian citizenship requirement for membership in the
Bar of British Columbia: Barristers and Solicitors Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, .c.
26,s.42.
Charter Section Breached: s. 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: British Columbia repealed the Banisters and
Solicitors Act in 1987 and replaced it: Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1987, c.
25, s. 28(1)(a). The text of that Act also makes Canadian citizenship a
bar membership requirement. However, the Order in Council bringing
the new Act into effect excluded those provisions which were ultimately
declared of no force and effect byAndrews: B.C. Reg. 172/88. In 1993,
the unenforced sections were done away with by regulation: B.C. Reg.
325/93, and the definition of "Canadian citizen" in the Legal Profession
Act (which had been brought into force but obviously served no purpose)
was repealed: Legal Profession Amendment Act, 1993, S.B.C. 1993, c. 31,
s. 1.
Dixon v. British Columbia (A.G.)
(1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 247 (B.C.S.C.).
Law Affected: Statutorily created provincial voting districts with marked
disparities in their respective populations: Constitution Act, R.S.B.C.
1979, c. 62, s. 19.
Charter Section Breached: s. 3.
Legislative Sequel: British Columbia amended its voting districts in
1990: Electoral Districts Act, S.B.C. 1990, c. 39. The amending statute
made note of the population of each defined district in parentheses;
these ranged from approximately 29,500 to approximately 45,000.
Black v. Law Society of Alberta,
[19891 1 S.C.R. 591.
Law Affected: Rules which purported to restrict the entry of out-of-
province law firms to the legal profession in Alberta: Rules of the Law
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Society ofAlberta, ss. 75B, 154.
Charter Section Breached: s. 6(2)(b).
Legislative Sequel: In June of 1989, the Benchers of the Law Society of
Alberta rescinded the impugned rules. They have not been replaced.
Alberta completely revised its rules in 1995 but out-of-province access to
the legal profession was not restricted.
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A. G.),
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
Law Affected: Alberta prohibition on publishing material on matrimonial
litigation except within narrowly defined parameters: Judicature Act,
R.S.A. 1980, c. J-1, s. 30.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: Alberta repealed the impugned section and its
associated provisions in 1991: Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act,
1991, S.A. 1991, c. 21, s. 15(3). A prohibition in the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c-46, s. 166, which resembled the Alberta statute was
repealed in 1994: CriminalLawAmendment Act, 1994, S.C. 1994, c. 44, s.
9.
Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Ontario (Minister of
Education)
(1990), 71 O.R. (2d) 341 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Regulations pursuant to Ontario's Education Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 129, ss. 10(1), para. 18, 50, prescribing content and form
requirements for religious education in the public schools: R.R.O. 1980,
Reg. 262, s. 28.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(a).
Legislative Sequel: In 1990 (the same year as the decision), Ontario's
religious education regulations were significantly altered. Religious
education is optional to school boards and may involve the study of
different religions, but a programme of religion must not "indoctrinate"
students and shall, according to the regulations, "promote respect for
the freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms...": 0. Reg 677/90, ss. 29, 29a.
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 232.
Law Affected: Regulations pursuant to Ontario's Health Disciplines Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 196, which made advertising by dentists, with very
restricted exceptions, "professional misconduct": R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 447,
ss. 37(39), (41).
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Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: The regulations were altered in 1994. Now made
pursuant to the Dentistry Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 24, the new regulations
provide that advertising by dentists only constitutes misconduct where
the advertising is deceptive, non-factual in nature, suggests superiority
over other members of the profession, is "likely to create expectations of
favourable results or to appeal to the public's fears," or discloses specific
areas of practice without also indicating whether the dentist is a general
practitioner or a specialist in that field: 0. Reg 220/94, s. 1.
R. v. Martineau,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
Law Affected: Provision which defined as murder the causing of death
during the commission of another offence if an objective mental element
with respect to death ("ought to have known") could also be attributed
to the perpetrator: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 213(a).
Charter Section Breached: s. 7.
Legislative Sequel: No sequel found.
R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 906.
Law Affected: "Statutory rape" crime (having sexual intercourse with a
female under 14) in which there was no mens rea requirement with
respect to the victim's age: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, C-34, s. 146(1).
Charter Section Breached: s. 7.
Legislative Sequel: "Rape" is no longer referred to in the Criminal Code
(replaced with "sexual assault" in R.S.C. 1985, C-46, s. 271). However,
some offences such as sexual interference (s. 151), and sexual
exploitation (s. 153) in the Criminal Code are specifically directed at acts
involving a youth. With respect to these provisions, the current
legislation provides that "it is not a defence ... that the accused believed
that the complainant was fourteen years of age or more at the time the
offence is alleged to have been committed unless the accused took all
reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant": An Act to
Amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985 (3d
Supp.), c. 19, s. 1.
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada,
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 139.
Law Affected: Regulations which prohibited unauthorized "solicitation"
in federal airports: Government Airport Concession Operations
Regulations, SOR/79-373, ss. 7(a), (b) [hereinafter GACOR].
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Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: In 1995 the Federal Government amended the
GACOR: SOR/95-228. Non-commercial solicitation is no longer
mentioned; the new regulations are concerned only with businesses and
commercial undertakings, which are prohibited without a permit. Along
with the new regulations, the Department of Transport issued a
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement explaining that the invalidation
of the old regulations, in their commercial context, by the
Commonwealth case had led to "physical confrontations between
unauthorized taxi and limousine operators and limousine and taxi
operators who hold airport permits at Lester B. Pearson International
Airport": Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 1995.11.1467.
The impact statement is similar to the statutory preambles to several of
these legislative sequels in the sense that it anticipates challenges to the
enactment and offers "s. 1 justifications" for its provisions.
R. v. Swain,
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
Law Affected: Automatic committal of persons acquitted for insanity:
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 542(2), along with a rule of
common law which allowed the Crown to adduce evidence of an
accused's insanity against the wishes of the accused.
Charter Section Breached: ss. 7, 9.
Legislative Sequel: 1991 amendments to the Criminal Code provide for
review boards and disposition hearings and allow the court to order a
mental assessment if it is either raised by the accused, or if the
prosecutor satisfies the court that there is reasonable doubt as to the
accused's fitness to stand trial: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code
(mental disorder), S.C. 1991, c. 43, s. 672.12.
Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board),
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 69.
Law Affected: Limits on political activity of federal civil servants: Public
Service EmploymentAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-33, s. 33.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: No sequel found.
Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and
Immigration Commission),
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 22.
Law Affected: Provisions which called for unemployment insurance
benefits to cease at age 65: Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C.
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1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 31(1), (2) (4), as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 80, s. 10.
Charter Section Breached: s. 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: The impugned provisions had already been amended
by the time of the S.C.C. decision: An Act to Amend the Unemployment
Insurance Act, S.C. 1990, c. 40, s. 22.
R. v. Seaboyer,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
Law Affected: "Rape shield" provisions restricting the use of a
complainant's sexual history as evidence by the accused: Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 276, 277.
Charter Section Breached: ss. 7, 11(d).
Legislative Sequel: Parliament resurrected the "rape shield" by
amending its provisions in 1992, and adding procedures for a closed
court judicial examination of whether evidence will be admissible (ss.
276.1-276.5): An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C.
1992, c. 38, s. 2.
R. v. Bain,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 91.
Law Affected: Provision which allowed the prosecution (but not the
defence) to "stand-by" jurors: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 56,
3.
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(d).
Legislative Sequel: 1992 amendments repealed the provisions
invalidated by this case: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (jury), S.C.
1992, c. 41, s. 2.
R. v. Ggnereux,
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 259.
Law Affected: Provisions and corresponding regulations which did not
adequately guard against executive interference with the judge advocate
in a General Court Martial: National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5, ss.
166-170.
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(d).
Legislative Sequel: The National Defence Act was amended to ensure
greater independence for the judge advocate: An Act to Amend the
National Defence Act, S.C. 1992, c. 16. Many of the offending
regulations had already been amended prior to the S.C.C. case.
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R. v. Downey,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 10.
Law Affected: Offence of living off the avails of prostitution which
placed an evidentiary burden on the accused to raise a reasonable doubt
if he was demonstrated to be living with, or habitually in the company of,
prostitutes: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 195(2).
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(d).
Legislative Sequel: No sequel found.
Schachter v. Canada,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
Law Affected: Benefits which were available to adoptive but not to
natural parents: Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.
48, s. 32(1), as am. by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 150, s. 5.
Charter Section Breached: s. 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: The impugned provisions had already been amended
by the time of the S.C.C. decision: An Act to Amend the Unemployment
Insurance Act, S.C. 1990, c. 40, s. 24.
Haig v. Canada
(1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (C.A.).
Law Affected: Omission of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of
discrimination: Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 3.1
Charter Section Breached: s. 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: The Canadian Human Rights Act was amended to
add sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination: An Act
to Amend the Canadian Human Rightv Act, S.C. 1996, c. 14, s. 1.
R. v. Zundel,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
Law Affected: Offence of wilfully publishing false news: Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 181.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: No sequel found.
1 Note that the Alberta Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion as did the Ontario
Court of Appeal, with respect to the Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act, S.A. 1980, c. 1-2, ss.
2(1), 4, 7(1), (2), (3), 8(1), 10, in Vriend v.Alberta (1996), 181 A.R. 16. The Alberta statute, like the
Canadian Human Rights Act, did not protect discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation; the
Alberta Court of Appeal held that this lack of protection did not constitute discrimination within
the meaning of s. 15(1) of the Charter, and upheld the validity of the Individual Rights Protection Act.
The Viend decision has been given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which will
provide a final determination of whether Haig or Vriend was correctly decided.
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R. v. Morales,
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 711.
Law Affected: Provision that allowed denial of bail by criteria which did
not meaningfully guide judicial discretion: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46, ss. 515(6)(a), (d).
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(e).
Legislative Sequel: No sequel found.
Baron v. Canada,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 416.
Law Affected: Specifically challenged was the procedure for obtaining
search warrants which appeared to give judges no discretion in deciding
whether to grant or deny them: Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s.
231.3, as am. by S.C. 1986, c. 6, s. 121. These amendments followed
MN.R v. Kruger, and Reference Re Print Three Inc., above.
Charter Section Breached: s. 8.
Legislative Sequel: 1994 amendments changed the impugned provision
to stipulate that judges "may" rather than "shall" grant a search warrant
under conditions set out in the An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act:
S.C. 1994, c. 21, s. 107.
Sauvi v. Canada (A.G.),
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 438.
Law Affected: Disqualifying prison inmates from voting in federal
elections: Canada Election Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e).
Charter Section Breached: s. 3.
Legislative Sequel: The disqualification of all inmates from voting, which
was questioned in Sauv6, had already been altered by the time of the
decision, pursuant to the same statute which removed the voting rights
barrier from federally-appointed judges (see Muldoon v. Canada, above)
and from those with mental disease (see Canadian Disability Rights
Council v. Canada, above). As amended, the Canada Election Act
barred from voting only those inmates who are serving a sentence of two
years or more: An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1993, c.
19, s. 23(2). However, in 1995, the Federal Court Trial Division held
that the amended law was also unconstitutional, and struck it down:
Sauvd v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) (T.D.), [1996] 1 F.C. 857. The
Federal Court disallowed an application by the Attorney General of
Canada to stay the declaration in this case: [1997] F.C.J. No. 594 (QL),
and all federal inmates were therefore eligible to vote in the June 2, 1997
elections. The judgment is currently under appeal to the Federal Court
of Appeal.
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Ramsden v. Peterborough (City of,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084.
Law Affected: Prohibiting postering on municipal public property: City
of Peterborough, By-law No. 3270, ss. 1, 2, as am. by By-law No. 1982-
147.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: Peterborough amended its Municipal Code in 1994
by providing for community bulletin boards within a specified zone and
by prohibiting other postering on municipal public property within that
area. The City, in enacting the by-law, notably included a four-
paragraph long justificatory preamble explaining the reasonableness of
its procedures and objectives: City of Peterborough, By-Law No. 94-108
(4 July 1994), amending articles 1-4 of Chapter 446 of the Peterborough
Municipal Code.
R. v. Grant; R. v. Wiley; R. v. Plant,
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 223; 263; 281.
Law Affected: Provision authorizing warrantless searches of places other
than dwelling houses: Narcotic ControlAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, s. 10.
Charter Section Breached: s. 8.
Legislative Sequel: The Narcotics ControlAct was repealed and replaced:
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. Under Part II of
the newAct, all such searches are to be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
Toronto (City oj) v. Quickfall
(1994), 16 O.R. (3d) 665 (C.A.)
Law Affected: By-laws collectively prohibiting postering on utility poles,
public buildings, and roads in Toronto: City of Toronto, By-law No.
12519, A By-Law Respecting Streets (10 March 1930), as am., s. 8; and
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, By-law No. 211-74,A By-Law To
regulate the use of Metropolitan Roads (5 November 1974), s. 12(8).
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: Metropolitan Toronto and its constituent
municipalities are currently working to design by-laws which would
regulate rather than prohibit postering. Neither Metro nor the City of
Toronto have enacted new by-laws, but a pilot project in Scarborough
has studied the merits of restricting postering on municipal property to
designated areas. The results were synthesized by the Area Sign
Committee in the spring of 1997, and new by-laws are now in the
drafting phase. See Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, Planning and
Transportation Committee, Installation of Poster Signs on Metro Roads,
Report No. 12 (Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 7 May




[1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
Law Affected: Common-law rule that self-induced intoxication is not a
valid defence to a crime of general intent, specifically sexual assault.
Charter Section Breached: s. 11(d).
Legislative Sequel: In 1995 a new s. 33.1 was introduced to the Criminal
Code. The enacting statute has a lengthy preamble explaining its social
motivations and grounding it in Charter principles such as equality. In
essence it directly overturns the Daviault decision, establishing (s.
33.1(2)) that a person who has induced his own intoxication has the
requisite criminal fault for actions taken while intoxicated, whether
voluntary or involuntary, which interefere or threaten to interfere with
another person's bodily integrity: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code
(self-induced intoxication), S.C. 1995, c. 32, s. 1.
R. v. Heywood,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 761.
Law Affected: Making it a crime of vagrancy for a person previously
convicted of certain crimes (for example, sexual assault) to be found
loitering in specified public places (playgrounds, bathing areas, etc.):
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 179(1)(b).
Charter Section Breached: s. 7.
Legislative Sequel: By the time of the S.C.C. ruling, Parliament had
enacted s. 161 of the Criminal Code which provides for orders of
prohibition for persons convicted of certain crimes which serve the same
purpose as did the vagrancy offence. A prohibition order may be for
life, but there is a procedure by which there can be a reconsideration of
the order where desirable because of changed circumstances: Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, C-46, s. 161, as am. by S.C. 1993, c. 45, s. 1.
Reference Re K.
(1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 679 (Prov. Ct.).
Law Affected: Definition of spouse which had the effect of preventing
homosexual couples from jointly adopting a child in Ontario: Child and
Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 136(1).
Charter Section Breached: s. 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
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Miron v. Trudel,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
Law Affected: Exclusion of a common-law spouse as a beneficiary of
compulsory automobile insurance policies due to limited definition of
"spouse" in Schedule C: Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218.
Charter Section Breached: s. 15(1).
Legislative Sequel: Ontario's automobile insurance laws were changed
significantly in 1990 and again in 1993 and are now substantially
different from those which were considered in this case. Current
provisions include a definition of "spouse" which contemplates the
inclusion of common-law spouses: Insurance Statute Law Amendment
Act, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 10.
Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (A.G.)
(1995), 136 A.R. 1 (Q.B.).
Law Affected: Provision which prevented political parties from
negotiating for the purchase of extra broadcast time in excess of a fixed
allotment based on the party's popular support: Canada Elections Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 310(1).
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
Statute Affected: Ban on cigarette advertising and mandated
unattributed warnings on all cigarette packages: Tobacco Products
ControlAct, S.C. 1988, c. 20, ss. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9.
Charter Section Breached: s. 2(b).
Legislative Sequel: A comprehensive package of amendments including
new packaging and advertising restrictions was enacted in 1997: Tobacco
Act, S.C. 1997, c. 13, Part IV.
Somerville v. Canada (A.G.)
(1996), 184 A.R. 241 (C.A.).
Statute Affected: Advertising "black outs" at the beginning and end of
election campaigns: Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 213.
Charter Sections Breached: ss. 2(b), 2(d), 3.
Legislative Sequel: None to date.
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